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KUALA LUMPUR: As Malaysia becomes the first Southeast �鶹��ýn nation to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) with Vietnam, the upgrade in diplomatic relations signals a more united stand against China’s claims in the South China Sea, say analysts.

The Southeast �鶹��ýn nations, both of which have overlapping claims with China in the strategic waterway, stand to gain from signing the CSP, experts told CNA.

They added that the announcement of the CSP, widely considered one of the highest levels of diplomatic ties, could pave the way for further relations between Vietnam and other Southeast �鶹��ýn nations.

Dr Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow from the Vietnam studies programme at the ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, said the enhanced partnership between Hanoi and Putrajaya could signal a “more cohesive ASEAN approach to addressing China's expansionism in the region”.

“Vietnam is methodically constructing a network of robust relationships with ASEAN neighbours to achieve strategic equilibrium vis-a-vis China's regional influence,” he told CNA.

The signing of the CSP took place during Vietnam’s Communist Party chief To Lam’s official visit to Malaysia from Nov 21 to Nov 23 at the invitation of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

It comes as Malaysia prepares to assume chairmanship of the Association of Southeast �鶹��ýn Nations (ASEAN) in 2025, making it the first ASEAN state to establish a CSP with fellow member Vietnam. Hanoi began upgrading its bilateral partnerships in 2008, starting with a CSP with Beijing, its first.

After the Malaysia-Vietnam CSP signing, the countries issued a joint statement on Nov 21 pledging further collaboration in defence and security issues, science and technology, green energy, education, human resources development, culture, sports, and tourism.

A point that stood out was a promise to work “closely” together to maintain security, stability, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, and to promote peaceful settlement of disputes.

The statement also mentioned the importance of adhering to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and to “refrain from undertaking activities that could escalate tension” in the South China Sea.

CHINA’S “DIVIDE AND CONQUER”

Malaysia needs Vietnam’s better military capabilities to counter Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, while Vietnam could tap into Malaysia’s geographical advantage at key routes in the same sea and the Strait of Malacca, an analyst said.

While both countries share a similar “policy dilemma” concerning China, Hanoi commands more “hard power deterrence” and is less dependent on Beijing for economic growth, Mr Collins Chong Yew Keat, a foreign affairs and security analyst at Universiti Malaya, told CNA.

On the other hand, Vietnam needs Malaysia’s geographical proximity to “key chokepoints” in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait, with a view towards developing deeper defence and security cooperation, said Mr Chong, who has written commentaries about the two countries' CSP.

Malaysia and Vietnam see the need to "strengthen political, economic and defence partnership in jointly responding to common threats, and in showing a renewed solidified front against external power pressure", he added.

This approach runs counter to what some observers have termed as China’s “divide and conquer” technique when dealing with Southeast �鶹��ýn claimant states on the South China Sea, most of which Beijing claims within its so-called nine-dash line.

Amid escalating hostilities between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, a conflict in which Manila has firmly chosen to stand with the United States, Beijing has embarked on a series of high-level diplomatic exchanges and defence engagements with individual Southeast �鶹��ýn nations.

Regional states’ negotiations with China over a code of conduct for the South China Sea have remained ongoing since 2002, casting doubt on the consensus-based grouping’s ability to take a decisive stand against Beijing.

With Southeast �鶹��ýn nations including the Philippines and Indonesia also involved in the South China Sea tensions with China, experts did not rule out the countries similarly upgrading their partnerships with Vietnam as a bulwark against Beijing.

In January, Vietnam signed an agreement with the Philippines to boost cooperation on maritime security. Then in September, Hanoi and Jakarta agreed to establish a CSP next year.

Dr Giang said it would be a “natural progression” for Vietnam to strengthen partnerships with Indonesia and the Philippines next, given how the trio shares concerns about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

“The CSP with Malaysia, potentially preceding one with Indonesia and the Philippines, illuminates Hanoi's strategic calculus of fostering solidarity among maritime claimants while reinforcing ASEAN's centrality in maintaining a rules-based order,” he said. 

The scuffle between China and the Philippines in the disputed and resource-rich Scarborough Shoal shows no signs of slowing down, with both countries’ coast guards trading accusations after the latest maritime confrontation between the neighbours.

China's Coast Guard said four Philippine ships had attempted to enter its territorial waters around the shoal on Wednesday, accusing the ships of “dangerously” approaching the coast guard’s “normal law enforcement patrol vessels”, Reuters reported.

But the Philippine Coast Guard said Chinese navy and coast guard vessels had taken "aggressive actions" against a routine patrol by it and the fisheries bureau.

Indonesia has repeatedly said that it is not a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, with the government reiterating on Nov 11 that it had no overlapping jurisdiction with China.

Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto’s recent visit to China yielded a joint statement that said the two countries had "reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims".

However, on Monday, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sugiono, who like many Indonesians goes by one name, clarified the statement, maintaining that Indonesia does not recognise China’s claim of Indonesia’s part of South China Sea or North Natuna Sea.

“While some regional states may exercise caution due to their particular circumstances, the momentum toward greater collaboration among claimant states is evident,” Dr Giang said.

“This trend becomes particularly salient given the increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment and the implications of a second Trump presidency, which may compel ASEAN states to further consolidate their strategic autonomy.”

Some analysts believe there is growing concern among Southeast �鶹��ýn states that US president-elect Donald Trump, who will be inaugurated in January next year, will upend Washington’s longstanding relationships in the Indo-Pacific as he pursues a more isolationist “America first” foreign policy.

SETTING DIFFERENCES ASIDE

Despite occasional friction in the past, some analysts say the recent CSP is indicative of Malaysia and Vietnam’s common interests and that they have set aside differences. 

In early October, Malaysia, in a rare rebuke, sent a complaint letter to Vietnam over the latter’s alleged expansion of a South China Sea reef that both countries claim as their own, Reuters reported in November.

Hanoi has remained silent on the complaint, in what analysts say reflects a careful diplomatic strategy to avoid jeopardising its relationship with an ASEAN neighbour, the South China Morning Post reported on Nov 7.

“While both countries do have overlapping claims in the South China Sea, they are also smaller nations that stand to benefit from a robust rules-based international order,” Dr Francis Hutchinson, coordinator of the Malaysia studies programme at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, told CNA.

“Consequently, it is in both nations’ interests to promote the upholding of international law, the freedom of navigation, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Both Vietnam and Malaysia continue to maintain lucrative economic ties with China even as they push back against Beijing’s maritime claims.

“The usage of ‘bamboo diplomacy’ has also ensured that Vietnam continues to maintain a balanced approach and in advocating for peace and stability with different powers,” said Mr Chong, referring to Hanoi’s strategy of flexibility when balancing competing geopolitical interests.

“This concept aligns well with Malaysia’s long-held diplomatic position and reach of non-alignment, and the mantra of peaceful co-existence in preventing conflicts and threats through diplomatic approach.”

MALAYSIA TOP CHOICE FOR VIETNAM

While Vietnam has CSPs with eight other countries, including global and regional powers such as China, the US, Japan and South Korea, it is notable that Putrajaya has become the first ASEAN member.

“This can be seen as a drive from Vietnam’s side to deepen its relationships with a wide range of players, organisations and groupings,” Dr Hutchinson said.

Malaysia remains an important trading partner for Vietnam, and more pertinently will be ASEAN chair in 2025, the analyst highlighted.

“As such, Malaysia will have considerable influence over what issues are discussed in ministerial meetings and how ASEAN communiques are structured and worded,” he added.

“This is a likely reason why out of all ASEAN members, Malaysia was approached first.”

In 2023, Singapore and Vietnam also agreed to upgrade their strategic partnership, established in 2013, to a CSP. On a visit to Vietnam last month, Singaporean Ambassador to Vietnam Jaya Ratnam said that Singapore hopes to elevate its relationship with Vietnam to this status by 2025. 

Singapore is not a claimant in the South China Sea and its Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan has said that “we do not take sides in the competing territorial and maritime claims”.

Mr Chong said Malaysia could capitalise on Vietnam’s strengths and elevating strategic partnerships to emerge as a joint economic powerhouse and a stabilising force in regional and global geopolitics.

“Both remain among the top destinations in attracting the next spectrum of top investments and inflow of trade and critical technology and industries, with the growing exodus of top firms from China,” he added.

“This will create a spillover and ripple impact from economic integration and joint development into the spheres of defence and security.”